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Abstract
To combat adversarial spelling mistakes, we
propose placing a word recognition model in
front of the downstream classifier. Our word
recognition models build upon the RNN semi-
character architecture, introducing several new
backoff strategies for handling rare and un-
seen words. Trained to recognize words cor-
rupted by random adds, drops, swaps, and
keyboard mistakes, our method achieves 32%
relative (and 3.3% absolute) error reduction
over the vanilla semi-character model. No-
tably, our pipeline confers robustness on the
downstream classifier, outperforming both ad-
versarial training and off-the-shelf spell check-
ers. Against a BERT model fine-tuned for sen-
timent analysis, a single adversarially-chosen
character attack lowers accuracy from 90.3%
to 45.8%. Our defense restores accuracy to
75%1. Surprisingly, better word recognition
does not always entail greater robustness. Our
analysis reveals that robustness also depends
upon a quantity that we denote the sensitivity.
1 Introduction
Despite the rapid progress of deep learning tech-
niques on diverse supervised learning tasks, these
models remain brittle to subtle shifts in the data
distribution. Even when the permissible changes
are confined to barely-perceptible perturbations,
training robust models remains an open challenge.
Following the discovery that imperceptible attacks
could cause image recognition models to misclas-
sify examples (Szegedy et al., 2013), a veritable
sub-field has emerged in which authors iteratively
propose attacks and countermeasures.
For all the interest in adversarial computer vi-
sion, these attacks are rarely encountered out-
side of academic research. However, adversarial
1All code for our defenses, attacks, and baselines is
available at https://github.com/danishpruthi/
adversarial-misspellings
Alteration Movie Review Label
Original A triumph, relentless and beautifulin its downbeat darkness +
Swap A triumph, relentless and beuatifulin its downbeat darkness –
Drop A triumph, relentless and beautifulin its dwnbeat darkness –
+ Defense A triumph, relentless and beautifulin its downbeat darkness +
+ Defense A triumph, relentless and beautifulin its downbeat darkness +
Table 1: Adversarial spelling mistakes inducing senti-
ment misclassification and word-recognition defenses.
misspellings constitute a longstanding real-world
problem. Spammers continually bombard email
servers, subtly misspelling words in efforts to
evade spam detection while preserving the emails’
intended meaning (Lee and Ng, 2005; Fumera
et al., 2006). As another example, programmatic
censorship on the Internet has spurred communi-
ties to adopt similar methods to communicate sur-
reptitiously (Bitso et al., 2013).
In this paper, we focus on adversarially-chosen
spelling mistakes in the context of text classifica-
tion, addressing the following attack types: drop-
ping, adding, and swapping internal characters
within words. These perturbations are inspired by
psycholinguistic studies (Rawlinson, 1976; Matt
Davis, 2003) which demonstrated that humans can
comprehend text altered by jumbling internal char-
acters, provided that the first and last characters of
each word remain unperturbed.
First, in experiments addressing both BiLSTM
and fine-tuned BERT models, comprising four
different input formats: word-only, char-only,
word+char, and word-piece (Wu et al., 2016), we
demonstrate that an adversary can degrade a clas-
sifier’s performance to that achieved by random
guessing. This requires altering just two charac-
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ters per sentence. Such modifications might flip
words either to a different word in the vocabu-
lary or, more often, to the out-of-vocabulary to-
ken UNK . Consequently, adversarial edits can de-
grade a word-level model by transforming the in-
formative words to UNK . Intuitively, one might
suspect that word-piece and character-level mod-
els would be less susceptible to spelling attacks
as they can make use of the residual word con-
text. However, our experiments demonstrate that
character and word-piece models are in fact more
vulnerable. We show that this is due to the ad-
versary’s effective capacity for finer grained ma-
nipulations on these models. While against a
word-level model, the adversary is mostly lim-
ited to UNK -ing words, against a word-piece or
character-level model, each character-level add,
drop, or swap produces a distinct input, providing
the adversary with a greater set of options.
Second, we evaluate first-line techniques in-
cluding data augmentation and adversarial train-
ing, demonstrating that they offer only marginal
benefits here, e.g., a BERT model achieving 90.3
accuracy on a sentiment classification task, is
degraded to 64.1 by an adversarially-chosen 1-
character swap in the sentence, which can only be
restored to 69.2 by adversarial training.
Third (our primary contribution), we propose a
task-agnostic defense, attaching a word recogni-
tion model that predicts each word in a sentence
given a full sequence of (possibly misspelled)
inputs. The word recognition model’s outputs
form the input to a downstream classification
model. Our word recognition models build upon
the RNN-based semi-character word recognition
model due to Sakaguchi et al. (2017). While our
word recognizers are trained on domain-specific
text from the task at hand, they often predict UNK
at test time, owing to the small domain-specific
vocabulary. To handle unobserved and rare words,
we propose several backoff strategies including
falling back on a generic word recognizer trained
on a larger corpus. Incorporating our defenses,
BERT models subject to 1-character attacks are
restored to 88.3, 81.1, 78.0 accuracy for swap,
drop, add attacks respectively, as compared to
69.2, 63.6, and 50.0 for adversarial training
Fourth, we offer a detailed qualitative analysis,
demonstrating that a low word error rate alone is
insufficient for a word recognizer to confer robust-
ness on the downstream task. Additionally, we
find that it is important that the recognition model
supply few degrees of freedom to an attacker. We
provide a metric to quantify this notion of sensi-
tivity in word recognition models and study its re-
lation to robustness empirically. Models with low
sensitivity and word error rate are most robust.
2 Related Work
Several papers address adversarial attacks on NLP
systems. Changes to text, whether word- or
character-level, are all perceptible, raising some
questions about what should rightly be considered
an adversarial example (Ebrahimi et al., 2018b;
Belinkov and Bisk, 2018). Jia and Liang (2017)
address the reading comprehension task, show-
ing that by appending distractor sentences to the
end of stories from the SQuAD dataset (Rajpurkar
et al., 2016), they could cause models to output in-
correct answers. Inspired by this work, Glockner
et al. (2018) demonstrate an attack that breaks en-
tailment systems by replacing a single word with
either a synonym or its hypernym. Recently, Zhao
et al. (2018) investigated the problem of producing
natural-seeming adversarial examples, noting that
adversarial examples in NLP are often ungram-
matical (Li et al., 2016).
In related work on character-level attacks,
Ebrahimi et al. (2018b,a) explored gradient-based
methods to generate string edits to fool classifica-
tion and translation systems, respectively. While
their focus is on efficient methods for generat-
ing adversaries, ours is on improving the worst
case adversarial performance. Similarly, Belinkov
and Bisk (2018) studied how synthetic and natu-
ral noise affects character-level machine transla-
tion. They considered structure invariant represen-
tations and adversarial training as defenses against
such noise. Here, we show that an auxiliary word
recognition model, which can be trained on unla-
beled data, provides a strong defense.
Spelling correction (Kukich, 1992) is often
viewed as a sub-task of grammatical error correc-
tion (Ng et al., 2014; Schmaltz et al., 2016). Clas-
sic methods rely on a source language model and a
noisy channel model to find the most likely correc-
tion for a given word (Mays et al., 1991; Brill and
Moore, 2000). Recently, neural techniques have
been applied to the task (Sakaguchi et al., 2017;
Li et al., 2018), which model the context and or-
thography of the input together. Our work extends
the ScRNN model of Sakaguchi et al. (2017).
3 Robust Word Recognition
To tackle character-level adversarial attacks, we
introduce a simple two-stage solution, placing a
word recognition model (W ) before the down-
stream classifier (C). Under this scheme, all inputs
are classified by the composed model C ◦W . This
modular approach, with W and C trained sepa-
rately, offers several benefits: (i) we can deploy the
same word recognition model for multiple down-
stream classification tasks/models; and (ii) we can
train the word recognition model with larger unla-
beled corpora.
Against adversarial mistakes, two important
factors govern the robustness of this combined
model: W ’s accuracy in recognizing misspelled
words and W ’s sensitivity to adversarial perturba-
tions on the same input. We discuss these aspects
in detail below.
3.1 ScRNN with Backoff
We now describe semi-character RNNs for word
recognition, explain their limitations, and suggest
techniques to improve them.
ScRNN Model Inspired by the psycholinguis-
tic studies (Matt Davis, 2003; Rawlinson, 1976),
Sakaguchi et al. (2017) proposed a semi-character
based RNN (ScRNN) that processes a sentence
of words with misspelled characters, predict-
ing the correct words at each step. Let s =
{w1, w2, . . . , wn} denote the input sentence, a se-
quence of constituent words wi. Each input word
(wi) is represented by concatenating (i) a one hot
vector of the first character (wi1); (ii) a one hot
representation of the last character (wil, where
l is the length of word wi); and (iii) a bag of
characters representation of the internal characters
(
∑l−1
j=2wij). ScRNN treats the first and the last
characters individually, and is agnostic to the or-
dering of the internal characters. Each word, rep-
resented accordingly, is then fed into a BiLSTM
cell. At each sequence step, the training target is
the correct corresponding word (output dimension
equal to vocabulary size), and the model is opti-
mized with cross-entropy loss.
Backoff Variations While Sakaguchi et al.
(2017) demonstrate strong word recognition per-
formance, a drawback of their evaluation setup is
that they only attack and evaluate on the subset
of words that are a part of their training vocabu-
lary. In such a setting, the word recognition per-
formance is unreasonably dependent on the cho-
sen vocabulary size. In principle, one can design
models to predict (correctly) only a few chosen
words, and ignore the remaining majority and still
reach 100% accuracy. For the adversarial setting,
rare and unseen words in the wild are particularly
critical, as they provide opportunities for the at-
tackers. A reliable word-recognizer should handle
these cases gracefully. Below, we explore different
ways to back off when the ScRNN predicts UNK
(a frequent outcome for rare and unseen words):
• Pass-through: word-recognizer passes on
the (possibly misspelled) word as is.
• Backoff to neutral word: Alternatively,
noting that passing UNK -predicted words
through unchanged exposes the downstream
model to potentially corrupted text, we con-
sider backing off to a neutral word like
‘a’, which has a similar distribution across
classes.
• Backoff to background model: We also
consider falling back upon a more generic
word recognition model trained upon a larger,
less-specialized corpus whenever the fore-
ground word recognition model predicts
UNK 2. Figure 1 depicts this scenario pic-
torially.
Empirically, we find that the background model
(by itself) is less accurate, because of the large
number of words it is trained to predict. Thus,
it is best to train a precise foreground model on
an in-domain corpus and focus on frequent words,
and then to resort to a general-purpose background
model for rare and unobserved words. Next, we
delineate our second consideration for building ro-
bust word-recognizers.
3.2 Model Sensitivity
In computer vision, an important factor determin-
ing the success of an adversary is the norm con-
straint on the perturbations allowed to an image
(||x − x′||∞ < ). Higher values of  lead to
a higher chance of mis-classification for at least
one x′. Defense methods such as quantization (Xu
et al., 2017) and thermometer encoding (Buck-
man et al., 2018) try to reduce the space of pertur-
bations available to the adversary by making the
model invariant to small changes in the input.
2Potentially the background model could be trained with
full vocabulary so that it never predicts UNK
Figure 1: A schematic sketch of our proposed word recognition system, consisting of a foreground and a back-
ground model. We train the foreground model on the smaller, domain-specific dataset, and the background model
on a larger dataset (e.g., the IMDB movie corpus). We train both models to reconstruct the correct word from
the orthography and context of the individual words, using synthetically corrupted inputs during training. Subse-
quently, we invoke the background model whenever the foreground model predicts UNK .
In NLP, we often get such invariance for free,
e.g., for a word-level model, most of the pertur-
bations produced by our character-level adversary
lead to an UNK at its input. If the model is robust
to the presence of these UNK tokens, there is little
room for an adversary to manipulate it. Character-
level models, on the other hand, despite their supe-
rior performance in many tasks, do not enjoy such
invariance. This characteristic invariance could be
exploited by an attacker. Thus, to limit the number
of different inputs to the classifier, we wish to re-
duce the number of distinct word recognition out-
puts that an attacker can induce, not just the num-
ber of words on which the model is “fooled”. We
denote this property of a model as its sensitivity.
We can quantify this notion for a word recogni-
tion system W as the expected number of unique
outputs it assigns to a set of adversarial pertur-
bations. Given a sentence s from the set of sen-
tences S, let A(s) = s1′, s2′, . . . , sn′ denote the
set of n perturbations to it under attack type A,
and let V be the function that maps strings to an
input representation for the downstream classifier.
For a word level model, V would transform sen-
tences to a sequence of word ids, mapping OOV
words to the same UNK ID. Whereas, for a char
(or word+char, word-piece) model, V would map
inputs to a sequence of character IDs. Formally,
sensitivity is defined as
SAW,V = Es
[
#u(V ◦W (s1′), . . . , V ◦W (sn′))
n
]
,
(1)
where V ◦W (si) returns the input representation
(of the downstream classifier) for the output string
produced by the word-recognizer W using si and
#u(·) counts the number of unique arguments.
Intuitively, we expect a high value of SAW,V to
lead to a lower robustness of the downstream clas-
sifier, since the adversary has more degrees of
freedom to attack the classifier. Thus, when using
word recognition as a defense, it is prudent to de-
sign a low sensitivity system with a low error rate.
However, as we will demonstrate, there is often a
trade-off between sensitivity and error rate.
3.3 Synthesizing Adversarial Attacks
Suppose we are given a classifier C : S → Y
which maps natural language sentences s ∈ S to
a label from a predefined set y ∈ Y . An adversary
for this classifier is a functionAwhich maps a sen-
tence s to its perturbed versions {s′1, s′2, . . . , s′n}
such that each s′i is close to s under some notion
of distance between sentences. We define the ro-
bustness of classifier C to the adversary A as:
RC,A = Es
[
min
s′∈A(s)
1[C(s′) = y]
]
, (2)
where y represents the ground truth label for s. In
practice, a real-world adversary may only be able
to query the classifier a few times, hence RC,A
represents the worst-case adversarial performance
of C. Methods for generating adversarial exam-
ples, such as HotFlip (Ebrahimi et al., 2018b), fo-
cus on efficient algorithms for searching the min
above. Improving RC,A would imply better ro-
bustness against all these methods.
Allowed Perturbations (A(s)) We explore ad-
versaries which perturb sentences with four types
of character-level edits: (1) Swap: swapping two
adjacent internal characters of a word. (2) Drop:
removing an internal character of a word. (3) Key-
board: substituting an internal character with ad-
jacent characters of QWERTY keyboard (4) Add:
inserting a new character internally in a word. In
line with the psycholinguistic studies (Matt Davis,
2003; Rawlinson, 1976), to ensure that the pertur-
bations do not affect human ability to comprehend
the sentence, we only allow the adversary to edit
the internal characters of a word, and not edit stop-
words or words shorter than 4 characters.
Attack Strategy For 1-character attacks, we try
all possible perturbations listed above until we
find an adversary that flips the model prediction.
For 2-character attacks, we greedily fix the edit
which had the least confidence among 1-character
attacks, and then try all the allowed perturbations
on the remaining words. Higher order attacks can
be performed in a similar manner. The greedy
strategy reduces the computation required to ob-
tain higher order attacks3, but also means that the
robustness score is an upper bound on the true ro-
bustness of the classifier.
4 Experiments and Results
In this section, we first discuss our experiments on
the word recognition systems.
4.1 Word Error Correction
Data: We evaluate the spell correctors from §3 on
movie reviews from the Stanford Sentiment Tree-
bank (SST) (Socher et al., 2013). The SST dataset
consists of 8544 movie reviews, with a vocabu-
lary of over 16K words. As a background cor-
pus, we use the IMDB movie reviews (Maas et al.,
2011), which contain 54K movie reviews, and a
vocabulary of over 78K words. The two datasets
do not share any reviews in common. The spell-
correction models are evaluated on their ability
to correct misspellings. The test setting consists
of reviews where each word (with length ≥ 4,
barring stopwords) is attacked by one of the at-
tack types (from swap, add, drop and keyboard at-
3Its complexity is O(l), instead of O(lm) where l is the
sentence length and m is the order.
tacks). In the all attack setting, we mix all attacks
by randomly choosing one for each word. This
most closely resembles a real world attack setting.
Experimental Setup In addition to our word
recognition models, we also compare to After
The Deadline (ATD), an open-source spell cor-
rector4. We found ATD to be the best freely-
available corrector5. We refer the reader to Sak-
aguchi et al. (2017) for comparisons of ScRNN to
other anonymized commercial spell checkers.
For the ScRNN model, we use a single-layer Bi-
LSTM with a hidden dimension size of 50. The
input representation consists of 198 dimensions,
which is thrice the number of unique characters
(66) in the vocabulary. We cap the vocabulary
size to 10K words, whereas we use the entire vo-
cabulary of 78470 words when we backoff to the
background model. For training these networks,
we corrupt the movie reviews according to all at-
tack types, i.e., applying one of the 4 attack types
to each word, and trying to reconstruct the original
words via cross entropy loss.
Word Recognition
Spell-Corrector Swap Drop Add Key All
ATD 7.2 12.6 13.3 6.9 11.2
ScRNN (78K) 6.3 10.2 8.7 9.8 8.7
ScRNN (10K) w/ Backoff Variants
Pass-Through 8.5 10.5 10.7 11.2 10.2
Neutral 8.7 10.9 10.8 11.4 10.6
Background 5.4 8.1 6.4 7.6 6.9
Table 2: Word Error Rates (WER) of ScRNN with each
backoff strategy, plus ATD and an ScRNN trained only
on the background corpus (78K vocabulary) The error
rates include 5.25% OOV words.
Results We calculate the word error rates
(WER) of each of the models for different at-
tacks and present our findings in Table 2. Note
that ATD incorrectly predicts 11.2 words for ev-
ery 100 words (in the ‘all’ setting), whereas, all of
the backoff variations of the ScRNN reconstruct
better. The most accurate variant involves backing
off to the background model, resulting in a low er-
ror rate of 6.9%, leading to the best performance
on word recognition. This is a 32% relative error
4https://www.afterthedeadline.com/
5We compared ATD with Hunspell (http:
//hunspell.github.io/), which is used in Linux
applications. ATD was significantly more robust owing to
taking context into account while correcting.
reduction compared to the vanilla ScRNN model
with a pass-through backoff strategy. We can at-
tribute the improved performance to the fact that
there are 5.25% words in the test corpus that are
unseen in the training corpus, and are thus only
recoverable by backing off to a larger corpus. No-
tably, only training on the larger background cor-
pus does worse, at 8.7%, since the distribution of
word frequencies is different in the background
corpus compared to the foreground corpus.
4.2 Robustness to adversarial attacks
We use sentiment analysis and paraphrase detec-
tion as downstream tasks, as for these two tasks,
1-2 character edits do not change the output labels.
Experimental Setup For sentiment classifica-
tion, we systematically study the effect of
character-level adversarial attacks on two architec-
tures and four different input formats. The first
architecture encodes the input sentence into a se-
quence of embeddings, which are then sequen-
tially processed by a BiLSTM. The first and last
states of the BiLSTM are then used by the soft-
max layer to predict the sentiment of the input. We
consider three input formats for this architecture:
(1) Word-only: where the input words are encoded
using a lookup table; (2) Char-only: where the
input words are encoded using a separate single-
layered BiLSTM over their characters; and (3)
Word+Char: where the input words are encoded
using a concatenation of (1) and (2) 6.
The second architecture uses the fine-tuned
BERT model (Devlin et al., 2018), with an input
format of word-piece tokenization. This model
has recently set a new state-of-the-art on sev-
eral NLP benchmarks, including the sentiment
analysis task we consider here. All models
are trained and evaluated on the binary version
of the sentence-level Stanford Sentiment Tree-
bank (Socher et al., 2013) dataset with only pos-
itive and negative reviews.
We also consider the task of paraphrase detec-
tion. Here too, we make use of the fine-tuned
BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), which is trained and
evaluated on the Microsoft Research Paraphrase
Corpus (MRPC) (Dolan and Brockett, 2005).
6Implementation details: The embedding dimension size
for the word, char and word+char models are 64, 32 and
64 + 32 respectively, with 64, 64 and 128 set as the hidden
dimension sizes for the three models.
Baseline defense strategies Two common
methods for dealing with adversarial examples
include: (1) data augmentation (DA) (Krizhevsky
et al., 2012); and (2) adversarial training (Adv)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014). In DA, the trained
model is fine-tuned after augmenting the training
set with an equal number of examples randomly
attacked with a 1-character edit. In Adv, the
trained model is fine-tuned with additional adver-
sarial examples (selected at random) that produce
incorrect predictions from the current-state classi-
fier. The process is repeated iteratively, generating
and adding newer adversarial examples from the
updated classifier model, until the adversarial
accuracy on dev set stops improving.
Results In Table 3, we examine the robustness
of the sentiment models under each attack and de-
fense method. In the absence of any attack or
defense, BERT (a word-piece model) performs
the best (90.3%7) followed by word+char mod-
els (80.5%), word-only models (79.2%) and then
char-only models (70.3%). However, even single-
character attacks (chosen adversarially) can be
catastrophic, resulting in a significantly degraded
performance of 46%, 57%, 59% and 33%, respec-
tively under the ‘all’ setting.
Intuitively, one might suppose that word-piece
and character-level models would be more robust
to such attacks given they can make use of the
remaining context. However, we find that they
are the more susceptible. To see why, note that
the word ‘beautiful’ can only be altered in a few
ways for word-only models, either leading to an
UNK or an existing vocabulary word, whereas,
word-piece and character-only models treat each
unique character combination differently. This
provides more variations that an attacker can ex-
ploit. Following similar reasoning, add and key
attacks pose a greater threat than swap and drop
attacks. The robustness of different models can be
ordered as word-only>word+char> char-only∼
word-piece, and the efficacy of different attacks as
add > key > drop > swap.
Next, we scrutinize the effectiveness of defense
methods when faced against adversarially chosen
attacks. Clearly from table 3, DA and Adv are not
7The reported accuracy on SST-B by BERT in Glue
Benchmarks is slightly higher as it is trained and evalu-
ated on phrase-level sentiment prediction task which has
more training examples compared to the sentence-level task
we consider. We use the official source code at https:
//github.com/google-research/bert
Sentiment Analysis (1-char attack/2-char attack)
Model No attack Swap Drop Add Key All
Word-Level Models
BiLSTM 79.2 (64.3/53.6) (63.7/52.7) (60.0/43.2) (60.2/42.4) (58.6/40.2)
BiLSTM + ATD 79.3 (76.2/75.3) (66.5/59.9) (55.6/47.5) (62.6/57.6) (55.8/37.0)
BiLSTM + Pass-through 79.3 (78.6/78.5) (69.1/65.3) (65.0/59.2) (69.6/65.6) (63.2/52.4)
BiLSTM + Background 78.8 (78.9/78.4) (69.6/66.8) (62.6/56.4) (68.2/62.2) (59.6/49.0)
BiLSTM + Neutral 80.1 (80.1/79.9) (72.4/70.2) (67.2/61.2) (69.0/64.6) (63.2/54.0)
Char-Level Models
BiLSTM 70.3 (53.6/42.9) (48.8/37.1) (33.8/14.8) (40.8/22.0) (32.6/14.0)
BiLSTM + ATD 71.0 (66.6/65.2) (58.0/53.0) (54.6/44.4) (61.6/57.5) (46.5/35.4)
BiLSTM + Pass-through 70.3 (65.8/62.9) (58.3/54.2) (54.0/44.2) (58.8/52.4) (51.6/39.8)
BiLSTM + Background 70.1 (70.3/69.8) (60.4/57.7) (57.4/52.6) (58.8/54.2) (53.6/47.2)
BiLSTM + Neutral 70.7 (70.7/70.7) (62.1/60.5) (57.8/53.6) (61.4/58.0) (55.2/48.4)
Word+Char Models
BiLSTM 80.5 (63.9/52.3) (62.8/50.8) (57.8/39.8) (58.4/40.8) (56.6/35.6)
BiLSTM + ATD 80.8 (78.0/77.3) (67.7/60.9) (55.6/50.5) (68.7/64.6) (48.5/37.4)
BiLSTM + Pass-through 80.1 (79.0/78.7) (69.5/65.7) (64.0/59.0) (66.0/62.0) (61.5/56.5)
BiLSTM + Background 79.5 (79.6/79.0) (69.7/66.7) (62.0/57.0) (65.0/56.5) (59.4/49.8)
BiLSTM + Neutral 79.5 (79.5/79.4) (71.2/68.8) (65.0/59.0) (65.5/61.5) (61.5/55.5)
Word-piece Models
BERT 90.3 (64.1/47.4) (59.2/39.9) (46.2/26.4) (54.3/34.9) (45.8/24.6)
BERT + DA 90.2 (68.3/50.6) (62.7/39.9) (43.6/17.0) (57.7/32.4) (41.0/15.8)
BERT + Adv 89.6 (69.2/52.9) (63.6/40.5) (50.0/22.0) (60.1/36.6) (47.0/20.2)
BERT + ATD 89.0 (84.5/84.5) (73.0/64.0) (77.0/69.5) (80.0/75.0) (67.0/55.0)
BERT + Pass-through 89.8 (85.5/83.9) (78.9/75.0) (70.4/64.4) (75.3/70.3) (68.0/58.5)
BERT + Background 89.3 (89.1/89.1) (79.3/76.5) (76.5/71.0) (77.5/74.4) (73.0/67.5)
BERT + Neutral 88.3 (88.3/88.3) (81.1/79.5) (78.0/74.0) (78.8/76.8) (75.0/68.0)
Table 3: Accuracy of various classification models, with and without defenses, under adversarial attacks. Even
1-character attacks significantly degrade classifier performance. Our defenses confer robustness, recovering over
76% of the original accuracy, under the ‘all’ setting for all four model classes.
effective in this case. We observed that despite a
low training error, these models were not able to
generalize to attacks on newer words at test time.
ATD spell corrector is the most effective on key-
board attacks, but performs poorly on other attack
types, particularly the add attack strategy.
The ScRNN model with pass-through backoff
offers better protection, bringing back the adver-
sarial accuracy within 5% range for the swap at-
tack. It is also effective under other attack classes,
and can mitigate the adversarial effect in word-
piece models by 21%, character-only models by
19%, and in word, and word+char models by over
4.5% . This suggests that the direct training signal
of word error correction is more effective than the
indirect signal of sentiment classification available
to DA and Adv for model robustness.
We observe additional gains by using back-
ground models as a backoff alternative, because of
its lower word error rate (WER), especially, under
the swap and drop attacks. However, these gains
do not consistently translate in all other settings,
as lower WER is necessary but not sufficient. Be-
sides lower error rate, we find that a solid defense
should furnish the attacker the fewest options to
attack, i.e. it should have a low sensitivity.
As we shall see in section § 4.3, the backoff
neutral variation has the lowest sensitivity due to
mapping UNK predictions to a fixed neutral word.
Thus, it results in the highest robustness on most
of the attack types for all four model classes.
Model No Attack All attacks
1-char 2-char
BERT 89.0 60.0 31.0
BERT + ATD 89.9 75.8 61.6
BERT + Pass-through 89.0 84.5 81.5
BERT + Neutral 84.0 82.5 82.5
Table 4: Accuracy of BERT, with and without defenses,
on MRPC when attacked under the ‘all’ attack setting.
Sensitivity Analysis
Backoff Swap Drop Add Key All
Closed Vocabulary Models (word-only)
Pass-Through 17.6 19.7 0.8 7.3 11.3
Background 19.5 22.3 1.1 9.5 13.1
Neutral 17.5 19.7 0.8 7.2 11.3
Open Vocab. Models (char/word+char/word-piece)
Pass-Through 39.6 35.3 19.2 26.9 30.3
Background 20.7 25.1 1.3 11.6 14.7
Neutral 17.5 19.7 0.8 7.2 11.3
Table 5: Sensitivity values for word recognizers. Neu-
tral backoff shows lowest sensitivity.
Table 4 shows the accuracy of BERT on 200 ex-
amples from the dev set of the MRPC paraphrase
detection task under various attack and defense
settings. We re-trained the ScRNN model vari-
ants on the MRPC training set for these experi-
ments. Again, we find that simple 1-2 character
attacks can bring down the accuracy of BERT sig-
nificantly (89% to 31%). Word recognition mod-
els can provide an effective defense, with both our
pass-through and neutral variants recovering most
of the accuracy. While the neutral backoff model
is effective on 2-char attacks, it hurts performance
in the no attack setting, since it incorrectly mod-
ifies certain correctly spelled entity names. Since
the two variants are already effective, we did not
train a background model for this task.
4.3 Understanding Model Sensitivity
Experimental setup To study model sensitiv-
ity, for each sentence, we perturb one randomly-
chosen word and replace it with all possible per-
turbations under a given attack type. The resulting
set of perturbed sentences is then fed to the word
recognizer (whose sensitivity is to be estimated).
As described in equation 1, we count the number
of unique predictions from the output sentences.
Two corrections are considered unique if they are
mapped differently by the downstream classifier.
Results The neutral backoff variant has the low-
est sensitivity (Table 5). This is expected, as it
returns a fixed neutral word whenever the ScRNN
predicts an UNK , therefore reducing the number
of unique outputs it predicts. Open vocabulary
(i.e. char-only, word+char, word-piece) down-
stream classifiers consider every unique combi-
nation of characters differently, whereas word-
only classifiers internally treat all out of vocab-
ulary (OOV) words alike. Hence, for char-only,
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Figure 2: Effect of sensitivity and word error rate on
robustness (depicted by the bubble sizes) in word-only
models (left) and char-only models (right).
word+char, and word-piece models, the pass-
through version is more sensitive than the back-
ground variant, as it passes words as is (and each
combination is considered uniquely). However,
for word-only models, pass-through is less sen-
sitive as all the OOV character combinations are
rendered identical.
Ideally, a preferred defense is one with low sen-
sitivity and word error rate. In practice, however,
we see that a low error rate often comes at the cost
of sensitivity. We see this trade-off in Figure 2,
where we plot WER and sensitivity on the two
axes, and depict the robustness when using differ-
ent backoff variants. Generally, sensitivity is the
more dominant factor out of the two, as the error
rates of the considered variants are reasonably low.
Human Intelligibility We verify if the senti-
ment (of the reviews) is preserved with char-level
attacks. In a human study with 50 attacked (and
subsequently misclassified), and 50 unchanged re-
views, it was noted that 48 and 49, respectively,
preserved the sentiment.
5 Conclusion
As character and word-piece inputs become com-
monplace in modern NLP pipelines, it is worth
highlighting the vulnerability they add. We
show that minimally-doctored attacks can bring
down accuracy of classifiers to random guess-
ing. We recommend word recognition as a safe-
guard against this and build upon RNN-based
semi-character word recognizers. We discover that
when used as a defense mechanism, the most ac-
curate word recognition models are not always the
most robust against adversarial attacks. Addition-
ally, we highlight the need to control the sensitiv-
ity of these models to achieve high robustness.
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